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Abstract Much research has been done on positive selfevaluation and its relationship to mental health. However,
little is known about its neural underpinnings. Imaging
studies have suggested that the brain’s default network is
involved with self-related processing and that one portion
of the default network, medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), is
particularly involved with self-evaluation. Here, we used
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to causally demonstrate that this network, and particularly MPFC, is
involved with self-evaluative processing. In a first experiment, 27 healthy volunteers judged whether adjectives,
evenly divided between desirable and undesirable traits,
described themselves or their best friends, and a robust
self-enhancement bias effect was found. In a second
experiment, single-pulse TMS was applied targeting three
locations (MPFC and left and right parietal cortex) in a
different group of healthy volunteers while they performed
the adjective task. In each trial, TMS was applied at one of
five different times relative to onset of the adjective

ranging from 0 to 480 ms. TMS affected self-enhancement
bias in a site- and latency-specific manner: at MPFC, the
self-enhancement bias actually reversed at 160 ms, with
subjects favoring their best friend over themselves. TMS
may thus be of use in investigating areas of mental illness
in which self-evaluation is abnormal, potentially as a
diagnostic tool. In addition, the present study, combined
with our previous reports (Lou et al., Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 101(17):6827–6832, 2004, Exp Brain Res 207:27–38,
2010), causally demonstrates two kinds of self-related
processing within the default network, one centered in
parietal cortex and concerned with retrieval of self-related
associations, and the other MPFC-centered and involved in
self-evaluative processing.
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The ‘‘self’’ remains an ill-defined concept, and yet it
remains central to psychological theory and psychiatric
practice. One neurobiological approach to understanding
and defining the self-concept is to examine the structures in
the brain that participate in self-specific processing. One
leading candidate for such a structure is the ‘‘default’’
network of the brain, a network that was initially recognized as a common pattern of deactivations occurring in
imaging contrasts during PET or fMRI over a wide spectrum of tasks when images obtained during the task conditions were contrasted with resting or control conditions
(Raichle 1998). This same network has typically been
activated in imaging studies in which tasks are used that
contrast self-related stimuli with non-self-related stimuli,
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for example using self versus other faces (Kircher et al.
2000, 2001; Platek et al. 2004), names (Perrin et al. 2005;
Sugiura et al. 2006), information (Maguire and Mummery
1999; Vinogradov et al. 2006; Nuňez et al. 2005), traits,
appearance, attitudes, or feelings (Craik et al. 1999; Gusnard et al. 2001; Kircher et al. 2000, 2001; Kelley et al.
2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Lou et al. 2004; Kjaer et al.
2002; Fossati et al. 2004; Schmitz et al. 2004; Ochsner
et al. 2005). Given its activation when subjects are
inwardly directed and also when processing self-related
items, it has been suggested that the default network supports a tonically active system that continuously evaluates
external and internal context and permits the experience of
self-awareness and consciousness (Andreasen et al. 1995;
Cavanna and Trimble 2006; Damasio 2010; Gusnard and
Raichle 2001).
These suggested roles for the default network remain
speculative to the degree that they are based on brain
imaging data, which can only be correlative. In fact, the
same brain imaging studies have been used to make a case
that the default network is not specifically activated by selfrelated content, but is involved in a more general process
involved with reasoning and memory (Ruby and Legrand
2008). On the other hand, transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS), a noninvasive means of temporarily altering the
function of precise brain regions, offers a way of testing
whether direct causal relationships link brain with behavior. TMS has been used to examine processing of self/other
relationships in the default network and has found evidence
for its involvement in self-specific processing (Kwan et al.
2007, Lou et al. 2004, 2010; Uddin et al. 2006). In our own
work, we used a task in which subjects rated adjectives as
like or unlike themselves or their best friend. Almost all
subjects demonstrated a self-reference effect (SRE) in this
task, a performance superiority for processing self- as
opposed to other-related stimuli when speed and accuracy
of responses are compared. Such SREs may indicate a
functionally distinct cognitive system for self-knowledge
(e.g., Rogers et al. 1977). We used single-pulse TMS
applied to default network nodes (midline prefrontal cortex
in Lou et al. 2004, 2010, precuneus in Lou et al. 2004, and
left and right lateral parietal cortex in Lou et al. 2010) at
various times ranging from 0 to 480 ms after the onset of
the visually presented adjective. The SRE was abolished
(with disruption for self-related adjectives but no effect on
performance in best-friend trials) with single TMS pulses
to precuneus at 160 ms and to right parietal cortex at
480 ms. At the left parietal site, TMS nullified the SRE
at all latencies tested, and may have reversed the SRE at
160 ms, such that performance in the best friend condition
was better than that in the self-condition. These results
support the idea that the posterior portion of the default
network, centered on left parietal cortex, is involved with
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self-specific processing, more specifically with the categorization and recall of self-related traits.
While midline prefrontal cortex (MPFC) was tested in
both studies (Lou et al. 2004, 2010), a TMS effect on selfrelated processing was not found. This was somewhat
surprising, given the ubiquity of activation results in this
region in self/other contrasts in imaging experiments, and
specifically, MPFC involvement during evaluation of selfrelevant verbal stimuli (Craik et al. 1999; Fossati et al.
2003, 2004; Heatherton et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2002).
The lack of a MPFC self/other TMS effect in the Lou et al.
studies may have been due to the exact MPFC site chosen,
the time of TMS application, or the relative unpleasantness
or distractibility of stimulation to frontal scalp. Another
possibility is that the MPFC does not contribute substantially to the SRE in the adjective task, leaving the source of
the SRE to posterior regions. Instead, its contribution
to self-specific processing might be more evaluative in
nature. There is considerable evidence that MPFC may be
involved in networks associated with self-monitoring and
self-evaluation (Gusnard et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2005;
Ochsner et al. 2004, 2005). Gusnard et al. (2001) in particular demonstrated MPFC activation in self-referential
judgments, evaluating pleasantness versus unpleasantness
of affectively normed pictures.
In this regard, a self-related TMS effect has been produced using the same adjective task as Lou et al., but
employing a different behavioral measure (Kwan et al.
2007). They took advantage of the fact that the adjectives
in the task included equal amounts of desirable and undesirable traits. They found subjects were typically biased
toward agreeing with more desirable traits and not agreeing
with undesirable traits when describing themselves as
opposed to their best friend, a self-enhancement effect. In
applying TMS, a single pulse to MPFC at 500 ms SOA, but
not to SMA or precuneus, eliminated this bias. This outcome suggested that the MPFC portion of the default network does indeed process self-specific information, albeit
specialized for different functions than parietal cortex.
To investigate this possibility, we have re-analyzed the
data of Lou et al. (2010), by initially segregating all trials
according to whether the adjectives exemplified desirable
or undesirable traits, and tested whether a self-enhancement TMS effect was present in our own data. We did this
with three goals in mind. First, given that we applied TMS
to MPFC at approximately the same time (480 ms after
adjective onset) in one of our conditions, we could replicate the effect seen in Kwan et al. (2007). Second, we
could also considerably extend the Kwan et al’s finding
within the default network both dynamically and topographically, as we examined a range of time points from 0
to 480 ms after adjective onset, as well as two more
regions within the network besides MPFC (left and right
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lateral parietal cortex). Third, we would be able for the first
time to use TMS to demonstrate the simultaneous presence
of two self-related processes in the same network (here, the
default network), one giving rise to an SRE and the other to
a self-enhancement effect. Most important in this regard is
that by demonstrating the activity of two qualitatively
different sorts of self-specific processing, evidence would
be provided that the default network is involved with a
system centered around self-specific processing.

Methods
Subjects
Forty-five healthy subjects were recruited and provided
written informed consent for the study, which was approved
by the NY State Psychiatric Institute IRB. Twenty-seven
(sixteen male) with mean age of 26.9 ± 1.5 years participated in an initial behavioral experiment, performing an
adjective task with no TMS. Eighteen subjects (eight male)
with mean age of 28.6 ± 2.7 years volunteered for the TMS
experiment, performing the adjective task while receiving
TMS. Data from the eighteen subjects in this second group
were presented in Lou et al. (2010). Subjects were required to
have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All subjects were
screened for psychiatric disorders, substance abuse/dependence, a history of neurological disease, pregnancy, or seizure risk factors.
Adjective task
A set of 555 adjectives describing personality characteristics and which were rated according to likableness were
obtained from Anderson (1968). From this set, six 90-word
lists were randomly chosen (without replacement) for each
subject to be used in the experimental session. In each set of
90 words, half of the words were chosen from those in
Anderson (1968) that were rated as desirable, and the other
half undesirable. In each trial, an adjective appeared on a
computer monitor and remained on the screen for a maximum of 4 s, and disappeared when the subject responded
(Fig. 1). As a list of adjectives was presented, subjects
were asked to rate the applicability of each adjective to
one’s self or, in separate blocks, his/her best friend. Then,
each word was presented again with the requirement for
the subject to indicate with a yes/no button press as quickly
as possible whether or not the adjective had been judged to
describe him/her self (or the best friend). The order of self
and best friend conditions was counterbalanced between
subjects.
In a first experiment, twenty-seven subjects performed
this task for both self and best friend conditions in a single

179

session without TMS. This was done in order to establish
the size and predominance of the self-enhancement effect
as it occurred in the adjective task in healthy subjects. In a
second experiment, a new group of subjects performed the
task while TMS was applied to different cortical regions, in
order to assess the influence of TMS on the established
self-enhancement effect.
TMS application
In the second experiment, 18 participants received singlepulse TMS, applied using a figure 8 coil (9 cm diameter)
powered by a Magstim 200 stimulator (Magstim Co.,
Whitland, South West Wales, UK). TMS stimulus intensity
was set at 150 % of resting motor threshold of the left
hemisphere, with motor threshold determined after Rothwell et al. (1999). Three cortical sites were selected for
stimulation: left and right lateral parietal cortex (angular
gyrus) and midline prefrontal cortex (Fig. 2) based on
previous imaging work (Lou et al. 2004). Order of
stimulation sites in the session was counterbalanced
between subjects. The sites were identified using highresolution structural MRI scans obtained for each subject
(except in 5 subjects without scans where the International 10/20 system was used). The coil was positioned
and accuracy of placement continuously monitored during task performance using Brainsight, a computerized
frameless stereotaxic system (Rogue Research, Montreal,
Canada).
For each trial of a list’s second presentation, a single
pulse of TMS was delivered with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the onset of an adjective and the
TMS pulse of 0, 80, 160, 240, or 480 ms. Choice of SOA
was randomized for each trial, with the constraint that
eighteen trials of each SOA occurred during each 90-trial
block and no more than four trials in a row had the same
SOA. A TMS block was performed for Self and Best
Friend conditions, counterbalanced across subjects, at each
of the three stimulation sites. Each session lasted approximately 2.5 h.
Analysis
An index of self-enhancement (SEI) was generated after
Kwan et al. (2007). In the case of desirable adjectives, each
‘‘yes’’ response was assigned a value of 1, and each ‘‘no’’
response a 0. For undesirable adjectives, each ‘‘yes’’
response received a -1, and each ‘‘no’’ response a 0. In
summing these scores, a total greater than zero indicated a
tendency to respond positively and less than zero a tendency to respond negatively (within a total range of -45 to
?45). Comparing self and best friend conditions can be
achieved via self–best friend subtraction, where a positive
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Fig. 1 Schematic depiction of
the adjective task
friendly

insincere

word stimulus

word stimulus

5 s ITI

5 s ITI

80 ms
TMS

subject
response

5 s ITI

480 ms
TMS

subject
response

Fig. 2 Schematic diagram
showing locations and TMS coil
orientations for the three target
sites (from left to right): medial
prefrontal, right parietal, and
left parietal cortex sites

value indicates a self-enhancement tendency. This comparison results in the SEI.
The goal of the first experiment was to establish that a
self-enhancement effect was reliably present in subjects
performing the adjective task and that the SEI captured this
effect. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA comparing
number of answers was performed with factors of pleasant
versus unpleasant adjectives, agree versus disagree response,
and self versus best friend condition. Here, we looked for
interactions of self/best friend with the other two factors,
followed by a t test of the SEI as greater than zero to indicate
the presence of the self-enhancement bias.
It was important to establish that the SEI captured the
enhancement effect in the first experiment, because otherwise the ANOVA needed would be 5-way, with the addition of five SOAs and three stimulation sites, resulting in
too many degrees of freedom for the number of subjects.
The SEI incorporates the effects of pleasant/unpleasant and
agree/disagree in an index that directly combines these
factors to indicate a bias toward self or best friend. Using
the SEI also allows a comparison with Kwan et al. (2007),
where results were reported only using that index.
Having established a reliable effect and the reliability of
the SEI in capturing the effect in the first experiment, the
goal of the second experiment was to observe the effect of
TMS on the SEI in a site- and time-specific fashion. A
repeated measures ANOVA comparing SEIs across Site
(MPFC, right parietal, left parietal) and SOA (0, 80, 160,
240, 480 ms) was thus performed. Eighteen subjects
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participated in the TMS experiment. However, three subjects felt discomfort during prefrontal TMS and dropped
out, with the result that the ANOVA was run on the data
from fifteen subjects in the TMS experiment. ANOVAs
using factors with three or more levels (here, Site and
SOA) were tested for sphericity. In the case of departures
from sphericity (if the Greenhouse–Geisser epsilon was
\0.70), a repeated measures MANOVA was used in place
of the ANOVA. Otherwise, the probability value was
Greenhouse–Geisser-corrected. Post hoc comparisons were
t tests comparing each SEI against a value of zero to
indicate the significant presence of a bias. Results were
Bonferroni-corrected for 5 SOAs and 3 sites.
Reaction time data in both experiments was also analyzed, using repeated measures ANOVAs comparing RTs
across pleasant versus unpleasant adjectives and self versus
best friend. The factor of agree/disagree was not included
in RT analyses because there were typically too few
responses in the pleasant/disagree and unpleasant/agree
categories to generate good individual estimates of RT.

Results
First experiment: Task performance without TMS
The three-way repeated measures ANOVA comparing the
number of answers across pleasant versus unpleasant
adjectives, agree versus disagree response, and self versus
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best friend condition resulted in two significant interactions:
pleasant/unpleasant 9 agree/disagree (F1,26 = 193.1, p \
0.001) and self/best friend 9 pleasant/unpleasant 9 agree/
disagree (F1,26 = 4.3, p \ 0.05). The first significant result
indicated the expected finding that agreement with pleasant
and unpleasant traits is asymmetric, that is, in general, subjects agree with pleasant traits and disagree with unpleasant
ones. The second significant result was evidence for a selfenhancement effect. The mean proportion of answers for
pleasant adjectives agreed with and unpleasant ones disagreed with (compared to the total number of pleasant and
unpleasant adjectives, respectively) in self and best friend
conditions for the 27 subjects who performed the task without
TMS is shown in Fig. 3. As can be observed in this figure,
subjects were more likely to attribute desirable traits to
themselves than to their best friends. On the other hand, they
were equally likely to reject an undesirable trait, whether about
themselves or their friend. When their responses were entered
into the SEI equation, two-thirds of the subjects had a positive
index, indicating a self-enhancement bias, while three had a
index of 0.0, indicating no bias, and six had a negative index,
with a bias toward the enhancement of their friend’s traits. The
group mean (and standard error) SEI was 5.5 % ± 2.7, which
was significantly greater than zero (t26 = 2.0, p \ 0.03),
demonstrating an overall self-enhancement in the task.
Subjects also were faster in responding to pleasant traits,
especially when they were answering about themselves.
Group mean (and SD) RT for the pleasant/self-condition was
786 ± 148 ms, for pleasant/best friend, 844 ± 151 ms, for
unpleasant/self, 835 ± 142, and for unpleasant/best friend,
872 ± 132 ms. A repeated measures ANOVA comparing

0.86
Self
Best Friend

Proportion of adjectives

0.84
0.82
0.8
0.78
0.76
0.74
0.72
0.7
Pleasant/agree

Unpleasant/disagree

Fig. 3 Mean proportion (and SE) of total pleasant adjectives agreed
with and unpleasant ones disagreed with in self and best friend
conditions for the 27 subjects who performed the task without TMS

RTs across pleasant versus unpleasant adjectives and self
versus best friend condition showed main effects of pleasant/
unpleasant and self/best friend, with no interaction. RTs were
significantly faster for desirable adjectives (F1,26 = 13.1,
p \ 0.002) and for the self-condition (F1,26 = 8.8, p \ 0.01).
Second experiment: Task performance
with single-pulse TMS
An initial repeated measures ANOVA comparing self and
best friend responses before they were joined into a single
SEI indicated that overall, the self-enhancement effect was
present in the new group of subjects, with a main effect of
self/best friend (F1,14 = 9.41, p \ .01).
The repeated measures ANOVA comparing SEIs across
Site (MPFC, right parietal, left parietal) and SOA (0, 80, 160,
240, 480 ms) resulted in a strong departure from sphericity
for SOA, and a repeated measures MANOVA was substituted. The MANOVA showed that TMS affected the selfenhancement effect in both a location- and a time-specific
manner. There were significant main effects of Site (F2,13 =
4.5, p \ 0.035) and SOA (F4,11 = 5.5, p \ 0.015). In addition, the Site 9 SOA interaction exhibited a statistical trend
(F8,7 = 3.5, p \ 0.058).
The SOA main effect provides evidence for a TMS effect,
as it would be difficult to interpret it as anything other than an
effect of TMS on processing in underlying cortex. While
superficial effects of TMS can cause an SOA effect in performance measures such as accuracy or RT, it is unclear how
they might cause time-sensitive changes in a measure of
differences in trait judgments between Self and Best Friend.
Likewise, while a superficial effect of TMS such as
unpleasantness at one site can be distracting and can cause a
site effect on performance measures such as RT or accuracy,
it is difficult to imagine how that could cause a reversal in trait
judgments between Self and Best Friend. The main effect of
Site is due to the mean SEI going to 0 % at MPFC, but
averaging 8 and 11 % at left and right parietal sites, respectively, with a significant difference between MPFC and right
parietal (t14 = 2.86, p \ .02, Bonferroni-corrected for Site).
The main effect of SOA is due to the SEI becoming negative
(favoring Best Friend) at 160 ms, while remaining positive
(favoring Self) at the other SOAs, a pattern seen most distinctly at MPFC (see Fig. 4a). Given the main effects of
SOA and Site, their likely interpretation as being due to the
effects of TMS on neural processing, as well as the trend in
the Site 9 SOA interaction, separate ANOVAs with SOA
as a factor were performed at each site. A main effect of
SOA was found only for the frontal location (F4,11 = 2.9,
p \ 0.05).
The SEIs for each SOA at each of the three scalp sites
are shown in Fig. 4, expressed as proportion of total
adjectives. At MPFC, the SEI across SOA forms a
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0.4

MPFC

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1

0

80

160

240

480

-0.2
-0.3
0.4
0.4

Right Lateral Parietal

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1

0

80

160

240

480

-0.2

In the RT data, there was a main effect of pleasant/
unpleasant (F1,14 = 27.8, p \ 0.0001), with responses to
undesirable traits (mean/SD, 918 ± 252 ms) slower overall
than to desirable ones (844 ± 218 ms), as was seen above
in the subjects that performed the task without TMS. There
was also a main effect of SOA (F4,11 = 5.81, p \ 0.01),
which was reported previously for this data (Lou et al.
2010).
A comparison of RT showed no significant differences
between the first and second experiments. A mixed model
ANOVA with between-groups factor of experiment (1, 2)
and repeated measures factors of pleasant/unpleasant and
Self/Best Friend yielded the same significant main effects
as in the first experiment alone, with RTs significantly
faster for desirable adjectives (F1,40 = 40.2, p \ 0.0001)
and for the self-condition (F1,40 = 7.8, p \ 0.01), but with
no significant main effect of or interactions with
experiment.

-0.3
-0.4

Discussion

0.4

Left Lateral Parietal

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1

0

80

160

240

480

-0.2
-0.3
-0.4

Fig. 4 Mean group SEI index (and SE) at the prefrontal, right and
left lateral parietal sites at the five SOAs. Vertical axis is proportion of
total adjectives

U-shaped function, with the self-enhancement effect
diminished at 80 and 240 ms, and reversed at 160 ms. A
one-tailed t test between SEI and zero at this latency
indicated an enhancement toward Best Friend (t14 = 3.24,
p = .045, Bonferroni-corrected for SOA and Site). Also, at
this latency, 11 of 15 subjects answered more positively to
best friend than self, with the others showing no difference.
At the right parietal site, the SEI at 160 ms vanished, while
at the left parietal site, a negative SEI occurred at 240 ms,
although this was not significant. In summary, while the
group in Experiment 2 showed an overall self-enhancement
effect, TMS modified this effect in a site- and time-specific
manner, and in particular, TMS to MPFC at 160 ms reversed
the self-enhancement and demonstrated the enhancement of
responses to Best Friend instead.
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A robust self-enhancement effect was found in a group of
subjects performing the adjective task without TMS, linked
to a positive self-enhancement index (SEI), and again in a
second group with TMS, replicating previous studies
(Kwan et al. 2007; Barrios et al. 2008). With single pulses
of TMS, the SEI was diminished in a site-specific and timespecific manner, creating a dynamic topography across
anterior and posterior portions of the default network.
Specifically, TMS to MPFC generated a U-shaped function
of SEI diminishment, with a negative peak with TMS at
160 ms after adjective onset, at which point subjects
actually were biased toward the enhancement of their best
friends over themselves. This topography of effects is
different than the one found previously with the same
subjects using a different measure emphasizing speed and
consistency of performance rather than judgment of
desirability (Lou et al. 2010), providing evidence for two
separate aspects of self-specific processing within the
default network, one more frontally centered and the other
centered in left posterior cortex.
It should be noted that without a no-TMS condition in
Experiment 2, the direction and magnitude of the TMS
effects cannot be interpreted with certainty. The data for
the second experiment were a reanalysis of data from a
TMS experiment (Lou et al. 2010) in which time and site
controls were sufficient to demonstrate TMS effects, and a
no-TMS condition was not performed. While another
no-TMS replication in the second experiment would of course
have been desirable, the SOA technique used here appears
to have successfully separated the normal SEI effect and
TMS-disrupted SEI. The usefulness of the SOA technique
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is based on the assumption that in a given cortical region
associated with a given task, there are critical time periods
when a single TMS pulse will be sufficient to disrupt
ongoing processing enough to create a behavioral manifestation of that disruption, while a pulse at a non-critical
time will have little or no effect, and behavior will be more
or less normal (e.g., subjects in the present case would
show the typical SEI effect). The SOA method has been
used in this way to study cortical processing dynamics with
great success almost from the time TMS was invented (e.g.,
Amassian et al. 1989). The SOA assumption appeared to
hold true in the present case as well. First, we convinced
ourselves that the SEI effect was reliable. It was first shown
using the adjective task in Kwan et al. (2007) with a
smaller group (N = 12) than used here in either experiment. We replicated the effect without TMS in the first
experiment. In the second experiment, it was then checked
that the self-enhancement effect was present overall: this
would be the case if the SOA assumption held, and TMS
had an effect only in a minority of the total time. This test
was passed as well: as reported, an ANOVA comparing
Self and Best Friend responses before they were joined into
a single SEI had a strong main effect distinguishing Self
and Best Friend. Moreover, inspection of Fig. 4 indicates
that at a time when TMS would not be expected to disturb
ongoing processing (i.e., SOA = 0, before any visual
information has left the retina), the SEI averages a positive
9 % across the three sites, a degree of self-enhancement
consistent with non-TMS results. The sensitive window for
the task appears to center at a latency of 160 ms, and the
SEI had gone back to a positive 10 % across sites at
480 ms. Thus, while the relationship between the SEI and
TMS effects cannot be known with certainty, the results
suggest that the SOA assumption was correct and that a
self-enhancement effect was generated, except at a critical
time when TMS could disrupt it.
The result of the present study is in accord with Kwan
et al. (2007), in which the SEI was eliminated with singlepulse TMS to the same region of MPFC, and extends that
study’s findings by demonstrating similar effects in two
posterior cortical regions. However, the reduction in SEI
was seen in Kwan et al. with stimulation at 500 ms after
adjective onset, while none was apparent in the present
study at a similar stimulation time (480 ms). There were
considerable differences between how Kwan et al. and the
present study applied TMS which may explain this discrepancy. First, the intensity of the TMS was much
stronger in this study (150 % MT) than in Kwan et al.
(90 % MT). The stronger stimulation certainly had a more
disruptive effect on the cortex immediately below the coil
and also affected a more extensive region, both across the
cortical surface and in depth. Either or both of these effects
may have resulted in a different temporal pattern of
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disruption of ongoing self-specific processing, and the
differing results suggest that parametric measurements
across TMS intensity and SOA in future experiments might
lead to richer understanding of the dynamic processing
involved. A second important difference was that in Kwan
et al., subjects were given TMS on first exposure to the
adjectives, while in the present study, subjects responded to
the same lists of adjectives twice in succession, with TMS
pulses only given during the second list. While this was
done to reduce RT variability in the TMS trials, this added
experience of the same stimuli may also have altered the
timing of processing so that the sensitive latency was
somewhat earlier.
One objection to the interpretation that TMS was
modulating a self-specific processing system in the present
study and in our previous reports (Lou et al. 2004, 2010)
might be that people in general have thought much more
about their own personality and have observed more often
their own names, faces, possessions, characteristics, etc.,
and so even in a general, non-self-specific processing
system, representations related to the self might thus be
stronger, leading to superior performance when dealing
with self-related items. This argument has been made in
reviews of self-enhancement effects in behavioral (Symons
and Johnson 1997) and physiological data (Gillihan and
Farah 2005). However, the TMS evidence from our previous reports and the present one argue against this interpretation, and instead provide causal evidence for an
interpretation of default network activity involving a selfspecific processing system. In our previous studies (Lou
et al. 2004, 2010), TMS modulated the SRE found in the
adjective task in two ways. First, TMS to midline and right
parietal sites nullified the SRE by lowering performance in
the Self condition without affecting performance in the
Best Friend condition. Representations of best friends in a
general memory store should be strong, although perhaps
not as strong as those for one’s self: disruptions caused by
TMS that lowered Self performance should also have disrupted Best Friend performance as well, although probably
to a lesser degree. Instead, only disruptions in the Self
conditions were observed, suggesting a system independently processing self-information. Second, TMS to left
parietal cortex resulted in a reversal of the SRE, such that
both performances in the Self condition diminished to the
level seen in the Best Friend condition, while the reverse
was true in the Best Friend condition. This suggested that
TMS to left parietal cortex not only disrupted processing
that lead to an SRE, but that it nullified the output of this
region that might normally compete with output from other
areas processing Best Friend information, such as the
immediately adjacent parieto-temporal cortex (Seghier
et al. 2010), resulting in a paradoxical TMS facilitation
effect (Walsh et al. 1999; Hayward et al. 2004). Again, this
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result suggests a self-specific processing system. The
results of the present report, using the same data that
supported self-specific processing resulting in an SRE,
reinforce this possibility. Here, we have shown that TMS
modulated a self-enhancement bias. SREs, the performance
facilitations for self-related items, might be explained by
stronger self-representations within a more general processing system (although our findings suggest otherwise).
However, biases are not performance facilitations: they are
an index of qualitative choices made, in this case directly
about the self (or best friend). As such, they are not subject
to the same sort of objections concerning relative matters
of degree a continuous performance variable like RT is
subject to. TMS affected this bias, and thus a judgment
process, in left and right parietal cortex already implicated
in the same data set in self-specific processing. The most
profound modulations of the judgment process behind the
self-enhancement bias occurred in MPFC, a region intimately connected with these parietal regions as part of the
default mode network.
Self-enhancement and MPFC
In our previous report (Lou et al. 2010), we found no-TMS
effects on the SRE in MPFC. At that time, we discussed a
number of possible reasons for this: that the timing of the
pulses was not correct to disrupt MPFC activity, that the
unpleasantness and/or distractibility of TMS pulses to that
part of the head may have interfered with subjects’ ability
to perform the task, or that the type of adjective taskrelated processing occurring in MPFC may have been
different than the parietal processing that was shown to be
sensitive to TMS. The results of the present re-analysis of
the same data indicate that the third possibility was likely
the correct one, since MPFC was sensitive to TMS disruption of judgmental biases in the adjective task. This
suggests that MPFC was involved with processing of an
evaluative nature that was sensitive to TMS disruption as
reflected in changes in the SEI, while parietal cortex was
involved with episodic retrieval processes in which TMS
could disrupt SRE performance effects.
A strong empirical case has been made that selfenhancement is a robust phenomenon occurring in most
people, in which they view themselves in unrealistically
positive terms, believe they have greater control over
events than they actually do, and hold unjustifiably optimistic views of their future (Taylor and Brown 1988,
1994). These illusions were held to contribute to positive
mental health, and it has been suggested that these biases
are lost in depression (Alloy and Abramson 1988; Beck
1967). While both the present study and Kwan et al. (2007)
provide causal evidence for MPFC involvement in selfspecific processing involving self-enhancement in MPFC,
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little is known regarding the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying self-enhancement. No imaging studies of
self-enhancement have been reported. Some imaging
studies have employed task manipulations using positive
and negative trait adjectives as stimuli to observe selfrelated processing (Fossati et al. 2004; Gusnard et al.
2001), but self-enhancement effects were not explicitly
studied. On the other hand, a great deal of evidence has
been amassed for MPFC participation in self-processing in
general. In particular, there have been a number of imaging
studies that used trait adjectives like the present study to
provide evidence for this role (Craik et al. 1999; Fossati
et al. 2003, 2004; Heatherton et al. 2006; Kelley et al.
2002; Lou et al. 2004; Ochsner et al. 2005; Schmitz et al.
2004). One distinction that has been observed in imaging
(and also in line with differing anatomical connections) has
been between dorsal and ventral MPFC (D’Argembeau
et al. 2007; Mitchell et al. 2006; Ochsner et al. 2005;
Schmitz and Johnson 2007). It has been suggested that
MPFC is sensitive overall to self-relevant task features,
with ventral MPFC supporting the representation of
affective and motivational states connected to the detection
of and orientation to self-relevant content, while similar
information is handled in dorsal MPFC at a more symbolic
level allowing introspective judgments and evaluation of
internal states (D’Esposito et al. 2000; Miller and Cohen
2001; Ochsner et al. 2005; Schmitz and Johnson 2007).
TMS would be expected to directly influence the shallower
dorsal MPFC rather than the deeper lying ventral MPFC,
suggesting that self-enhancement is integral to the selfevaluative judgments occurring there.
Simultaneous self-specific processes operating
within the default network
The data from Lou et al. (2010), which were reanalyzed
here to demonstrate self-enhancement, exhibited in that
study a robust SRE on adjective task performance. SREs
were seen as subjects performing the task consistently
performed faster and more accurately when responding to
traits describing themselves than those describing their best
friend. It is typical to find such an SRE when processing
stimuli related to the self compared to another (see Gillihan
and Farah 2005 for a review). Of interest, the dynamic
topographical patterns of TMS effects on self-enhancement
processing as indexed by the SEI (Fig. 4) and on processing underlying the SRE (Fig. 5) were quite different.
The SEI was most profoundly affected at MPFC, where a
U-shaped function across SOAs was evident, centered on a
reversal of the index at 160 ms, while there was no effect
of TMS on the SRE there at all. Instead, the SRE was most
strongly affected by TMS over left lateral parietal cortex,
eliminating it entirely between 160 and 480 ms SOA, while
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Fig. 5 Mean change (and SE) in performance efficiency scores
between Self and Best Friend conditions. A positive value indicates an
SRE. Scores are shown for each SOA, for TMS to a midline
prefrontal cortex, b left lateral parietal cortex, and c right lateral
parietal cortex (Adapted from Lou et al. 2010)

the SRE showed an effect of TMS only at 240 ms. With
TMS to right lateral parietal cortex, the SRE was nullified at
160 ms, echoing the strongest prefrontal effect, while the
SRE was affected only late, at 480 ms. Thus, while the use
of TMS provided evidence for self-specific processing at all
sites tested in the default network, its use also differentiated
two subprocesses, one centered on MPFC and indexed by
the SEI, and another indexed by the SRE and centered in left
lateral and medial parietal cortex (Lou et al. 2004). As
discussed above, the prefrontal process may be involved
with introspective evaluation and judgment of trait adjectives in a self-specific context. On the other hand, the posterior process may be more involved with the retrieval and
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placement of episodic memories within that self-oriented
context to enable such introspective evaluation (Lou et al.
2010). In that study, TMS results differentiated a more
general memory system that retrieved episodic and
semantic information involving the trait adjectives from a
self-specific process that takes that information as input.
Recent convergent evidence supporting this separation of
general memory and self-specific processes was an fMRI
study of 94 healthy subjects of activity in left parietal cortex
(Seghier et al. 2010), cortex where the strongest TMS
effects on the SRE occurred in Lou et al. In Seghier et al.,
areas within left lateral parietal cortex processing semantic
information retrieval were spatially segregated from default
network regions (presumably involved with self-specific
processing) lying in the same region.
While it has been argued here that the regions of the
default network appear to be involved in self-specific
processing, it might also be argued that the same prefrontal
and parietal areas have been shown to be involved with
many diverse and general processes such as attention,
cognitive control, and evaluation and judgment rather than
being specific to processing self-related content. This latter
line of thought goes back to some of the earliest PET
imaging studies whose results led to a theory of general
attention centered on midline PFC and parietal cortex
(Posner and Petersen 1995). On the other hand, there has
been a great amount of convergent evidence in brain
imaging studies that the default network is involved in selfspecific processing. The regions associated with this network—midline parietal and MPFC and left and right
angular gyri—consistently emerge in self/other image
contrasts within a context of a diverse array of tasks
involving a wide range of perceptual and cognitive processes, whether the tasks are centered on perceptual discriminations of self versus other faces (Kircher et al. 2000,
2001; Platek et al. 2004), episodic or semantic recall of
personal versus impersonal information (Maguire and
Mummery 1999; Vinogradov et al. 2006; Nuňez et al.
2005), or conceptual evaluation of one’s own versus
another’s personality traits, appearance, attitudes, or feelings (Craik et al. 1999; Gusnard et al. 2001; Kircher et al.
2000, 2001; Kelley et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2002; Kjaer
et al. 2002; Fossati et al. 2003; Schmitz et al. 2004;
Ochsner et al. 2005). For example, one fMRI study
investigated the brain substrate underlying deception
(Nuňez et al. 2005). Subjects were to lie or tell the truth
about a series of statements, some involving themselves
and others concerning more general semantic information.
In contrasting lie versus truth trials, they found a number of
brain regions activated such as lateral and ventral PFC. But
when they contrasted personal versus impersonal information, the regions associated with the default network
emerged.
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There is no conflict between the areas comprising the
default network being part of general executive, affective,
motor or perceptual systems and also processing self-specific information. In the present study, multiple processes
of evaluation and episodic recall were shown to be
simultaneously active in the default network. Each process
could be part of larger systems involved with the recall and
evaluation of concepts. What the TMS evidence suggests is
that when parts of these systems are in the default network,
the content worked on may be self-specific, or rather that
all content processed in that network is seen through a
self-specific lens. This may be due to the anatomical connectivity of medial parietal and MPFC directly with the
cingulate gyrus, the cingulum tract, and the superior frontooccipito fasciculus (van den Heuvel et al. 2009; Mufson
and Mesulam 1984; Beer et al. 2002), and with the medial
dorsal, ventrolateral, pulvinar, and ventral posterior lateral
nuclei of the thalamus, as shown through analyses of
functional connectivity with the default network portion of
postero-medial cortex, using slow oscillations in BOLD
imaging data recorded in the resting state (Cauda et al.
2010). This forms a loop of reciprocal cortico-cortical and
cortico-thalamic connections (Tononi and Edelman 2000),
which may form a neural substrate for self-awareness, and
perhaps act as a substrate for or with one that underlies the
‘‘working self,’’ a postulated system of control processes
centered around the goals of the individual (Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce 2000).

Conclusion
Overall, the present study and Lou et al. (2010) together
provide evidence that spatially and temporally targeted
TMS combined with appropriate performance measures
can be used to distinguish anterior and posterior subsystems within the default network involved in retrieval,
contextualization, and evaluation of self-specific information. In addition, the present study, together with Kwan
et al. (2007) and Barrios et al. (2008), provides convergent
evidence that MPFC is involved with self-evaluative processing and self-enhancement, and suggests that TMS
might be used as a probe to examine these phenomena and
possibly aid in diagnosis where deficits occur in selfawareness.
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